31.01.05. Regeringen vil sikre Kutjma med livslang pension

31.01.05. SDPU (o) uafklaret om, hvorvidt man er i opposition

31.01.05. Yushchenko outlines Ukraine's desire to "return to Europe"

28.01.05. EU vil ikke smække døren i for Ukraine

27.01.05. Jusjtjenko aflyser besøg i Bruxelles

27.01.05. Politiet siger, at transportministeren begik selvmord

27.01.05. "Vores Ukraine" splittet over Tymoshenko

26.01.05. Rusland opretholder sag mod Tymoshenko

26.01.05. Yushchenko's poisoning: the background

26.01.05. Jusjtjenko blev udsat for adskillige giftmordforsøg (eng.)

26.01.05. Jusjtjenko oplyser, at der vil blive rejst tiltale i Gongadze-sagen

25.01.05. IMF kræver, at Jusjtjenko fører en monetaristisk politik

24.01.05. Jusjtjenko: Tymoshenko har de bedste chancer

24.01.05. Tymoshenko udnævnt til fungerende premierminister

24.01.05. Jusjtjenko lovede i sin indsættelsestale at samle nationen (eng.)

23.01.05. Bush lykønsker Jusjtjenko i telefonsamtale

23.01.05. Jusjtjenko indsat som præsident

22.01.05. Samtlige socialdemokrater forlader regeringen og administrationen

21.01.05. New York Times: Kutjma ser tilbage med melankoli

20.01.05. Kutjma lykønsker Jusjtjenko med valget til Ukraines præsident

20.01.05. Putin lykønsker Jusjtjenko med valget til Ukraines præsident

20.01.05. Højesteret føjer Jusjtjenko og afviser Janukovytjs klager

20.01.05. Jusjtjenko erklæres officielt vinder i dag

19.01.05. Rusland anerkender Jusjtjenko som vinder

17.01.05. New York Times: SBU støttede "den orange revolution"  

16.01.05. Højesteret afviser de tre vigtigste af Janukovytj klager


16.01.05. Højesteret afviser de tre vigtigste af Janukovytj klager

Ukraines Højesteret har skåret i listen over de klager fra præsidentkandidat Viktor Janukovytj, som retten vil tage stilling til, oplyser Den centrale Valgkommissions pressetjeneste til nyhedsbureauet Interfaks-Ukrajina.

Den centrale Valgkommission har modtaget Højesterets beslutning af den 14. januar, som er blevet modtaget efter behandlingen af materialerne i tilknytning til Janukovytjs klager over Den centrale Valgkommissions undladelser, handlinger og beslutninger.

I resolutionsteksten fremhæves det, at Højesteretsdommer Lilija Hryhorjeva har fastslået, at den indgivne klage hører under Højesterets jurisdiktion, men at der i klagen er indeholdt krav, som allerede har været indklaget for Den centrale Valgkommission, og om hvilke Højesteret tidligere har afsagt kendelse.

Således handler flere punkter i klagens resolutionsdel om Den centrale Valgkommissions handlinger og undladelser, samt eksempler på overtrædelser af valgloven under hele valgkampen og under omvalget den 26. december.

Samtidig er Den centrale Valgkommissions handlinger og undladelser i forhold til forberedelsen og afholdelsen af valget den 26. december samt kommissionens resolutioner omkring behandlingen af klagerne og erklæringen fra valgdeltagerne om eksempler på lovovertrædelser allerede blevet indklaget for Højesteret.

Den 6. og 10. januar afviste Højesteret at imødekomme de klager, som gik på Den centrale Valgkommissions resolutioner, i hvilke Den centrale Valgkommission havde afvist at behandle Janukovytjs klager, som krævede at fastslå eksempler på massive overtrædelser af valgloven, samt overtrædelser af principperne i en valgproces under omvalget den 26. december, herunder af de handicappedes, ældres og gangbesværedes rettigheder og interesser, hvilket havde gjort det umuligt at nå frem til et sandfærdigt valgresultat i samtlige storvalgkredse.

Således  kan de krav, som påpeges i de relevante punkter i dens resolutionsmæssige del, ikke blive genstand for endnu en behandling i Højesteret.

Således er klagen optaget til behandling i Højesteret med undtagelse af kravene om at kende Den centrale Valgkommissions undladelser retsstridige, fordi den ikke tog stilling til de massive overtrædelser af lovgivningen under hele valgkampen; krav som vedrører påstanden om, at de massive overtrædelser ikke gør det muligt at komme frem til et troværdigt valgresultat; krav som vedrører etableringen af eksempler på overtrædelser af vanføres vælgerrettigheder.

Hvad angår de påstande, som vil blive behandlet, godkendte dommeren blandt andet kravet til Den centrale Valgkommission om at tilvejebringe resolution nr. 14 og 15 af den 10. januar samt protokollen fra mødet den 10. januar. Desuden vil man inddrage   Højesterets kendelser og Den centrale Valgkommissions resolutioner truffet efter den 3. december.

Det fremhæves i beslutningen, at sagen vil blive behandlet af Højesterets civilretskammer på et åbent møde den 17. januar kl. 11.00. UP.

17.01.05. New York Times: SBU støttede "den orange revolution" 

"How Top Spies in Ukraine Changed the Nation's Path"

By C. J. CHIVERS

Published: January 17, 2005

KIEV, Ukraine, Jan. 16 - As protests here against a rigged presidential election overwhelmed the capital last fall, an alarm sounded at Interior Ministry bases outside the city. It was just after 10 p.m. on Nov. 28.

More than 10,000 troops scrambled toward trucks. Most had helmets, shields and clubs. Three thousand carried guns. Many wore black masks. Within 45 minutes, according to their commander, Lt. Gen. Sergei Popkov, they had distributed ammunition and tear gas and were rushing out the gates.

Kiev was tilting toward a terrible clash, a Soviet-style crackdown that could have brought civil war. And then, inside Ukraine's clandestine security apparatus, strange events began to unfold.

While wet snow fell on the rally in Independence Square, an undercover colonel from the Security Service of Ukraine, or S.B.U., moved among the protesters' tents. He represented the successor agency to the K.G.B., but his mission, he said, was not against the protesters. It was to thwart the mobilizing troops. He warned opposition leaders that a crackdown was afoot.

Simultaneously, senior intelligence officials were madly working their secure telephones, in one instance cooperating with an army general to persuade the Interior Ministry to turn back.

The officials issued warnings, saying that using force against peaceful rallies was illegal and could lead to prosecution and that if ministry troops came to Kiev, the army and security services would defend civilians, said an opposition leader who witnessed some of the exchanges and Oleksander Galaka, head of the military's intelligence service, the G.U.R., who made some of the calls.

Far behind the scenes, Col. Gen. Ihor P. Smeshko, the S.B.U. chief, was coordinating several of the contacts, according to Maj. Gen. Vitaly Romanchenko, leader of the military counterintelligence department, who said that on the spy chief's orders he warned General Popkov to stop. The Interior Ministry called off its alarm.

Details of these exchanges, never before reported, provide insight into a hidden factor in the so-called Orange Revolution, the peaceful protests that overturned an election and changed the political course of a post-Soviet state.

Throughout the crisis an inside battle was waged by a clique of Ukraine's top intelligence officers, who chose not to follow the plan by President Leonid D. Kuchma's administration to pass power to Prime Minister Viktor F. Yanukovich, the president's chosen successor. Instead, these senior officers, known as the siloviki, worked against it.

Such a position is a rare occurrence in former Soviet states, where the security agencies have often been the most conservative and ruthless instruments of state power.

Interviews with people involved in these events - opposition leaders, chairmen of three intelligence agencies and several of their senior officers, Mr. Kuchma, a senior Western diplomat, members of Parliament, the interior minister and commander of the ministry's troops - offer a view of the siloviki's work.

The officers funneled information to Mr. Kuchma's rivals, provided security to opposition figures and demonstrations, sent choreographed public signals about their unwillingness to follow the administration's path and engaged in a psychological tug-of-war with state officials to soften responses against the protests.

Ultimately, the intelligence agencies worked - usually in secret, sometimes in public, at times illegally - to block the fraudulent ascension of Mr. Yanukovich, whom several of the generals loathe. Directly and indirectly, their work supported Viktor A. Yushchenko, the Western-oriented candidate who is now the president-elect.

Many factors that sustained the revolution that formed around Mr. Yushchenko are well known. They include Western support, the protesters' resolve, cash from wealthy Ukrainians, coaching by foreign activists who had helped topple presidents in Georgia and Serbia, the unexpected independence of the Supreme Court and cheerleading by a television station, Channel 5, which Mr. Kuchma never shut down.

19.01.05. Rusland anerkender Jusjtjenko som vinder

Rusland vil tage imod Viktor Jusjtjenkos ønske om at aflægge sit første besøg som Ukraines præsident til Moskva, sagde den russiske udenrigsminister Sergej Lavrov på en pressekonference i onsdags i Moskva ifølge RIA-Novosti.

"Rusland har flere gange understreget, at det vil respektere det ukrainske folks valg. Det gælder også Viktor Jusjtjenko, som har vundet det ukrainske præsidentvalg og gentagne gange har talt om, at Rusland er det første sted, han gerne vil besøge som præsident. Rusland vil tage imod et sådant ønske", sagde ministeren.

Han udtalte sig for en intensivering af de russisk-ukrainske relationer. "Vi har ikke brug for andet end en styrkelse af relationerne. I Ukraine findes der næppe en sådan politiker, som vil være parat til at tilrettelægge forholdet til Rusland på en anden måde. Jeg går ud fra, at disse interesser også fremover vil være grundlaget for vores relationer", fremhævede Lavrov.

Samtidig vides det nu med sikkerhed, at Jusjtjenko på trods af sine valgløfter om, at hans første rejse vil gå til Moskva har planer om at besøge Strasbourg den 24. januar, Polen den 27. januar og Davos den 28. januar. UP.

20.01.05. Jusjtjenko erklæres officielt vinder i dag

Højesteret har afvist at forbyde offentliggørelsen i regeringsavisen "Urjadovyj Kurjer" og parlamentsavisen "Holos Ukrajiny" af Den centrale Valgkommissions resolution om at erklære Viktor Jusjtjenko som vinder af præsidentvalget inden afslutningen af behandlingen af præsidentkandidat Viktor Janukovytjs klage. Ifølge nyhedsbureauet Ukrajinski Novyny fandt Højesteret ikke det fornødne grundlag for at udstede et sådant forbud.

Som tidligere oplyst havde Janukovytjs repræsentanter indgivet en begæring til Højesteret om at forbyde offentliggørelsen af Den centrale Valgkommissions resolution i aviserne "Urjadovyj Kurjer" og "Holos Ukrajiny" om Jusjtjenkos sejr ved præsidentvalget og afslutningen af behandlingen af Janukovytjs klage. Den 18. januar tillod Højesteret offentliggørelsen af Den centrale Valgkommissions resolution efter den 19. januar og annullerede hermed sit forbud mod offentliggørelse af den 11. januar. Forum.

20.01.05. Højesteret føjer Jusjtjenko og afviser Janukovytjs klager

Viktor Janukovytjs klage til Højesteret kan ikke tages til følge. Denne beslutning blev truffet kl. 2.40 om morgenen efter et næsten 4 timer langt lukket møde i Højesterets civile kammer og blev offentliggjort af formanden for det civile domstolskammer Anatolij Jarema.

"Højesterets civile domstolskammer har besluttet, at Viktor Janukovytjs klage over Den centrale Valgkommissions passivitet i forhold til at få fastslået valgresultatet og 
Den centrale Valgkommissions resolution vedrørende resultatet af afstemningen og resultatet af præsidentvalget, samt offentliggørelsen af resultaterne ikke kan tages til følge", sagde dommeren.

Efter at have behandlet materialerne fastslog Højesteret, at Den centrale Valgkommission havde vedtaget resolutionen om resultatet af omvalget og om præsidentvalget i overensstemmelse med lovgivningens krav.

I Højesterets beslutning bliver det påpeget, at alle Den centrale Valgkommissions resolutioner i forhold til forberedelsen af og gennemførelsen af omvalget den 26. januar er blevet indbragt for Højesteret, og at retten har stadfæstem dem.

Således er sagsøgerens krav om, at Den centrale Valgkommissions handlinger og undladelser kendes retsstridige, grundløse. I Højesterets beslutning bliver det også påpeget, at sagsøgeren ikke havde dokumenteret sin påstand om massive lovovertrædelser under omvalget den 26. december. 

Beslutning er endegyldig og kan ikke ankes. Efter oplæsningen af kendelsen blev mødesalen lukket. Dem, som befandt sig i salen, klappede taktfast af dommerne. UP. Interfaks-Ukrajina.

20.01.05. Putin lykønsker Jusjtjenko med valget til Ukraines præsident

Den russiske Føderations præsident Vladimir Putin har lykønsket Viktor Jusjtjenko med valget til Ukraines præsident, meddelte den russiske ambassades pressetjeneste i dag. "Tillykke med valget af Dem til posten som Ukraines præsident, jeg ønsker Dem al held og lykke", hedder det i lykønskningen.

"Udviklingen af et godt naboskab og et ligeberettiget forhold til Ukraine er en af Ruslands vigtigste nationale prioriteringer. Jeg er overbevist om, at en konsekvent udbygning af det strategiske partnerskab er i fuld overensstemmelse med vores folks langsigtede interesser.

Jeg vil også gerne fremhæve den særlige betydning af, at Rusland og Ukraine deltager aktivt i udformningen af Det fælles økonomisk rum indenfor SNG. Et effektivt samarbejde indenfor rammerne af disse integrationsbestræbelser skal åbne nye muligheder for vore borgere indenfor det forretningsmæssige, videnskabelige og humanitære samarbejde", fremhæves det i lykønskningen.

Vladimir Putin ønskede Jusjtjenko al held med en ansvarlig statsgerning, og "benyttede lejligheden" til at lykønske ham med det Nytår og Jul. Som bekendt har man fra russisk side tidligere sagt, at man vil lykønske den nyvalgte ukrainske præsident efter indsættelsen.

I dag lykønskede også Leonid Kutjma Jusjtjenko med valget til præsidentposten. ProUA.com

20.01.05. Kutjma lykønsker Jusjtjenko med valget til Ukraines præsident

Ukraines præsident Leonid Kutjma har ønsket Viktor Jusjtjenko tillykke med sejren ved præsidentvalget. 

Denne korte meddelelse blev offentliggjort af Kutjmas pressetjeneste torsdag kl. 11.30.

Det vides ikke, om Kutjma vil være tilstede under indsættelsen af Jusjtjenko, da det ifølge en procedure parlamentet har vedtaget, er formanden for Den centrale Valgkommission, som skal overdrage en nyvalgt præsident præsidentbeviset, mens formanden for Forfatningsdomstolen skal overdrage de officielle symboler på den ukrainske præsidents magt.

Derfor er der ikke behov for, at den gamle præsident er tilstede personligt.

Det vides også, at det er parlamentsformand Lytvyn, som skal indbyde Kutjma til indsættelsen. Sammen med formanden for Forfatningsdomstolen og Jusjtjenko skal han afstemme listen over indbudte personer og andre organisatoriske spørgsmål. UP.

21.01.05. Ukraine's Leader Looks Back in Melancholy

By C. J. CHIVERS

Published: January 21, 2005

KIEV, Ukraine, Jan. 16 - He continues to govern, exercising the remains of his power as he orders Ukraine's troops home from Iraq. He waits, and he says he plans a role in the life of a nation that, in what is now known as the Orange Revolution, almost allergically rejected the course he had set for it.

After 10 years in power, decades of influence and then scandal and opprobrium in his final term, President Leonid D. Kuchma's last hours in office are upon him. He admits to melancholy and says that his pride over Ukraine's advances since declaring its independence in 1991 is tinged with regret that he is leaving a nation divided. He concedes he might be arrested. His ambivalence is clear.

"One cannot be completely satisfied; many things I see now at a different angle," he said, leaning forward from a silk-covered, gold-leafed armchair inside the presidential administration building that last month was blockaded by demonstrators chanting, "Criminals, out!"

"However, looking back at my life, I think it could not be done in any different way," he said, quickly adding, "If I had known where I would stumble and fall, I would have put a cushion there."

In an interview in his office, Mr. Kuchma spoke in considerable detail about events that shook his nation, and offered a tentative self-assessment of his role.

[Mr. Kuchma is now formally a lame duck. Early Wednesday the Supreme Court rejected an election challenge by his former prime minister, Viktor F. Yanukovich, clearing the way for President-elect Viktor A. Yushchenko's inauguration to go ahead as scheduled on Sunday.]

Speaking on several subjects, Mr. Kuchma flashed a range of emotions. At times he laughed, sometimes waving away questions or referring them to members of his government. He was reflective, occasionally self-critical.

And he spoke with noticeable care, whether from caution or courtesy, about former political underlings. He also credited everyone involved in the ultimately peaceful revolution - from the government troops and both presidential candidates, to the oppositionists who filled Kiev's streets - for having managed, however harrowingly, to avoid violence.

"I saw it as a war of nerves," he said. "Who would cave in first? Thank God everybody's nerves were strong."

Now comes a period of assessment, a process he says will take time.

As a former missile-plant director who inherited the reins of a dysfunctional post-Soviet nation, Mr. Kuchma, 66, was a technocrat turned head of state, and brought with him a high intellect, management experience and a political base in a powerful clan as he confronted almost insurmountable problems. He departs with a much healthier nation but a darkly complicated legacy.

To his critics and the opposition that paralyzed Kiev in November and December, he is a president who presided over the corrupt privatization of the nation's resources, steering wealth toward supporters, relatives and eastern clans.

He has been accused of ordering the murder of a journalist, Georgy Gongadze, in 2000, of approving the sale of radar systems to Saddam Hussein's Iraq and of rigging the election for Mr. Yanukovich, his disastrous choice as successor. Having found himself caught between the competing interests of Russia and the West, he satisfied neither. His stature on the world stage has shrunk.

Yet Mr. Kuchma accomplished critical tasks, including a sustained collaboration with Washington in nuclear disarmament and the closing of Chernobyl, the nuclear power plant that in 1986 suffered the worst nuclear accident in history. He leaves a country with a rapidly expanding economy, with independent parliamentary factions, an opposition television station and an often lively press. These would be all but unimaginable instruments of democracy in many former Soviet republics led by their former Communist Party men.

Moreover, Mr. Kuchma is willingly stepping aside, confronting his critics with a paradox. However messy the transition has been, Mr. Kuchma will be able to note that with his leaving, Ukraine has taken a step toward joining a club - along with Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Georgia - of former republics of the Soviet Union that are developing democratic governance.

22.01.05. Samtlige socialdemokrater forlader regeringen og administrationen

Præsident Leonid Kutjma har afskediget lederne af sin administration og de guvernører, som er medlemmer af SDPU (o), oplyser præsidentens pressetjeneste. Kutjma har med sit dekret har afskediget følgende personer:

Viktor Medvedtjuk fra posten som formand for Ukraines præsidentadministration.

Jurij Zahorodnyj fra posten som 1. næstformand for Ukraines præsidentadministration.

Oleksij Isjtjenko fra posten som næstformand for Ukraines præsidentadministration og leder af Hovedstyrelsen for organisations- og kadrepolitikken og samarbejdet med regionerne.

Andre af Kutjmas dekreter har afskediget følgende personer:

Ivan Rizak fra posten som guvernør i Zakarpatska-regionen.

Vadym Ljoshenko fra posten som guvernør i Tjerkasy.

Mykhajlo Romaniv fra posten som guvernør i Tjernivtsi.

Valentyn Melnytjuk fra posten som guvernør i Tjernihiv.

Som bekendt er Medvedtjuk leder af partiet SDPU (o), mens alle de andre afskedigede (som forinden alle havde indgivet deres afskedsbegæring, red.) er medlemmer af SDPU (o) og sidder i partiets ledelse.

Desuden har Kutjma accepteret afskedsbegæringen fra sin 1. assistent Serhij Ljovotjkin og en gruppe af rådgivere og konsulenter i forbindelse med afslutningen af hans embedsperiode.

I sin henvendelse til Kutjma takker alle de afskedigede præsidenten "for den høje tillid og det indholdsrige og mangeårige samarbejde" og ønsker den nyvalgte præsidents folk "professionalisme, kompetence og initiativrigdom, ærlighed og hengivenhed overfor sagen".

I medfør af afskedsbegæringerne har Kutjma også afskediget sekretæren for Det nationale sikkerheds- og forsvarsråd Volodymyr Radtjenko, oplyser nyhedsbureauet Novosti-Ukrajina. Radtjenko har været sekretær for Det nationale sikkerheds- og forsvarsråd siden september 2003. UP.

22.01.05. Kutjma har vist Jusjtjenko rundt i præsidentpaladset

Torsdag brugt præsident Leonid Kutjma over to timer på at vise den nyvalgte præsident Viktor Jusjtjenko præsidentpaladsets faciliteter. Tv-stationen "5. kanal" oplyser ifølge sine kilder i præsidentens administration, at Kutjma har fremvist mødelokalerne og receptionslokalerne for Jusjtjenko.

Med henvisning til "folk fra Kutjmas omgivelser" oplyser "5.kanal", at denne ikke er fortvivlet over tabet af magtbeføjelserne og gør sig parat til et nyt liv.

"Præsidenten håber på at forblive en indflydelsesrig politiker. Kutjma har således allerede overvejet at deltage i parlamentsvalget næste år", påpeger "5.kanal".

Samtidig oplyser repræsentant for Det socialistiske parti Jurij Lutsenko, at SPU vil insistere på at få Kutjma for retten.

"Jeg er ikke i tvivl om, at Kutjma går en meget svær fremtid i møde, og at han hver eneste morgen vil vente på at få en indkaldelse fra rigsadvokaten. Sagen er, at Gud på den ene side lærte os at tilgive, men på den anden side lærte han samfundet at huske. Og der er nok at huske Kutjma for og stille til regnskab for", siger Lutsenko.

Samtidig er man på Uafhængighedspladsen i fuld gang med at opføre den scene, hvor Jusjtjenko skal holde tale efter at have aflagt sin ed. Nationalkonservatoriets søjler og andre bygninger i nærheden er klædt i orange farver. I "Det ukrainske Hus" vil der blive åbnet et pressecenter for 1500 journalister. "5. kanal". UP.

23.01.05. Jusjtjenko indsat som præsident

Viktor Jusjtjenko har aflagt ed som Ukraines tredje præsident efter frigørelsen fra Sovjetunionen. Det skete ved en timelang højtidelighed, og Jusjtjenko holdt umiddelbart efter sin første tale som præsident på Uafhængighedspladsen i Kiev.

Inden edsaflæggelsen mødtes Jusjtjenko med den afgående, amerikanske udenrigsminister Colin Powell, og han takkede for den amerikanske støtte til demokratiet i Ukraine.

Der blev svindlet med resulatet ved det første valg, og først efter omfattende og langvarige folkelige protester lykkedes det at få Ukraines Højesteret til at underkende valget.

Et nyvalg mellem Jusjtjenko og Viktor Janukovitj, der var premierminister under den nu afgåede præsident Kutjma, og havde hele statsapparatets støtte, gav Jusjtjenko en klar sejr.

23.01.05. Bush lykønsker Jusjtjenko i telefonsamtale

Om lørdagen lykønskede USA's præsident George Bush i en telefonsamtale Ukraines nyvalgte præsident Viktor Jusjtjenko med sejren, oplyser Jusjtjenkos pressetjeneste.

Ifølge pressetjenestens oplysninger udtrykte præsidenterne under deres samtale håb om et effektivt samarbejde mellem de to staters ledere.

På sin side lykønskede Jusjtjenko Bush med genvalget og den indsættelse, som fandt sted den 20. januar i Washington.

Ukraines præsident betonede, at vores lande er strategiske partnere. Han sagde, at han ser nye muligheder for samarbejde mellem Ukraine og De forenede Stater.

Jusjtjenko understregede, at "det ukrainske folk har gjort meget for at Ukraine blev demokratisk. Jeg er overbevist om, at verden snart vil se Ukraine som et andet land med andre mennesker og et andet styre".

Samtalen fandt sted ved 14.00-tiden Kiev-lokaltid og 7.00 Washongton-tid, oplyser pressetjenesten. UP.


24.01.05. Jusjtjenko lovede i sin indsættelsestale at samle nationen (eng.)

By STEVEN LEE MYERS

Published: January 24, 2005

KIEV, Ukraine, Jan. 23 - Viktor A. Yushchenko, his face disfigured by poison and his fate nearly undone by electoral fraud, took the oath of office as president of Ukraine on Sunday, vowing to unite a poor and deeply divided country and lead it into the mainstream of Europe.

Speaking first in Parliament and then in Kiev's central square, Mr. Yushchenko declared Ukraine's freedom and independence in thinly veiled remarks aimed at the departing president, Leonid D. Kuchma, and at Russia and its president, Vladimir V. Putin, who openly supported Mr. Yushchenko's opponent.

"Armed only by their faith and beliefs, the people won a beautiful and peaceful victory," he told tens of thousands of Ukrainians waving flags and banners in Independence Square, the site of the demonstrations that helped usher him to office. "It is a victory of freedom over tyranny, of law over lawlessness, of future over past."

Mr. Yushchenko's inauguration punctuated an extraordinary period in Ukraine's history that included two rounds of voting last fall, followed by huge street protests and a legal challenge that ultimately overturned the declared victory of his opponent, Viktor F. Yanukovich, and led to the third round of voting on Dec. 26, in which he triumphed.

In his speeches, Mr. Yushchenko, 50, was alternately conciliatory and defiant. His, he said, was a victory for all Ukrainians, and he pledged to honor the people's right to worship in their own faith, to embrace their own politics and to speak in the language of their ancestors; the last was a reference to the divisive issue of the Russian language, which Mr. Yanukovich had promised to make equal in law to Ukrainian.

Mr. Yushchenko also vowed to fight the corruption and the shadowy economy that had become characteristic of the tumultuous decade under Mr. Kuchma, during which a few people closely allied with power accumulated vast fortunes. "We shall create a democratic power - honest, professional and patriotic," he said. "The wall that separates government from the people will be destroyed."

Mr. Yushchenko, a former central banker and prime minister under the man he ultimately replaced, became the third president of this country of 48 million people since it declared its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991.

He did so facing not only the usual challenges of a new leader, but also expectations intensified by the eruption of public discontent after efforts by Mr. Kuchma's government to install Mr. Yanukovich as his chosen successor.

"The expectations are too great," Yulia Tishchenko, of the Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research in Kiev, said in an interview before the inauguration, warning that the public's jubilation over Mr. Yushchenko's victory would soon confront the harsh reality of governance. "Different segments of the population have different expectations. And he will not be able, in a short period of time, to live up to them."

The country has been strained by stark divisions of wealth, by poverty and by unemployment, which has forced millions to seek work abroad. Recent economic growth has slowed, while the federal budget has gone from a surplus to a deficit within months after a raft of campaign-related expenditures on pensions and other social benefits under Mr. Yanukovich, who until Dec. 31 was prime minister.

Mr. Yushchenko's aides and independent analysts also said that during the prolonged electoral dispute, the government continued to sell off state assets and provide long-term leases on commercial buildings in Kiev and entire enterprises in other parts of the country. "They are basically stealing stuff," said Roman M. Zvarich, a member of Mr. Yushchenko's coalition in Parliament.

Above all, Ukraine remains politically divided. In spite of Mr. Yushchenko's pleas for unity, Mr. Yanukovich did not attend the inauguration. Mr. Kuchma, who did, did not answer Mr. Yushchenko's subsequent call for all in Parliament to join him for his inaugural address on Independence Square.

24.01.05. Tymoshenko udnævnt til fungerende premierminister

Inden afrejsen til Moskva underskrev Ukraines præsident Viktor Jusjtjenko de første udnævnelser til sin regering.

Ukraines præsident har udnævnt Julia Tymoshenko til fungerende premierminister. Med et andet dekret har præsident Jusjtjenko nedlagt Ukraines præsidentadministration i dens nuværende form og har underskrevet en Forordning om etableringen af Ukraines præsidents sekretariat.

Oleksandr Zintjenko er udnævnt til Ukraines præsidents statssekretær. Petro Poroshenko er af Ukraines præsident blevet udpeget til posten som sekretær for Det nationale sikkerheds-og forsvarsråd, oplyser den ukrainske præsidents pressetjeneste. UP.

24.01.05. Jusjtjenko: Tymoshenko har de bedste chancer

Ukraines præsident Viktor Jusjtjenko betegner Julia Tymoshenkos kandidatur til posten som premierminister som den mest acceptable. Denne udmelding kom efter hans forhandlinger med den russiske præsident Putin.

"Af alle de foreslåede kandidater var Tymoshenkos kandidatur den mest acceptable på baggrund af de politiske konsultationer. Jeg håber, at Julia Volodymyrivna og hendes kabinet får succes", sagde Jusjtjenko.

Samtidig svarede Putin, da journalisterne bad ham om en vurdering af den nye regering: "Hvordan kan man komme med vurdering af den nye ukrainske regering. Den er ikke dannet endnu, og resultaterne af dens arbejde bør vurderes af borgerne i det land, som den fungerer i".

Putin oplyste endvidere, at Jusjtjenko havde informeret ham om de tiltag i udformningen af Ukraines regering, som han havde planlagt. RIA Novosti.


25.01.05. IMF kræver, at Jusjtjenko fører en monetaristisk politik

Den internationale Valutafond understreger, at Ukraine efter valget bør vende tilbage til en politik, der er i nøje overensstemmelse med budgettet, hedder det i en rapport fra Den internationale Valutafonds eksperter om den ukrainske økonomi, som blev offentliggjort i mandags, oplyser BBC's ukrainske afdeling. De internationale eksperter hævder, at økonomiens arbejde "for fuld tryk" kan føre til dens "overophedning" og videre ustabilitet.

Samtidig har de indflydelsesrige amerikanske senatorer Richard Lugar og Carl Levin foreslået at fritage ukrainsk økonomi for de begrænsninger, som blev indført under Den kolde Krig og er kendt under betegnelsen Jackson-Vennick tilføjelsen, som gør USA's handelsrelationer med de tidligere sovjetiske republikker afhængig af spørgsmålet om udvandring og en demokratisk udvikling. Senatorerne understreger, at en lov som afskaffer disse begrænsninger ville forbedre handelssamkvemmet mellem Ukraine USA.

Forleden sagde USA's udenrigsminister Colin Powell, da han var tilstede under indsættelsen af Jusjtjenko, at USA vil gøre alt hvad der står i deres magt for at hjælpe den nye præsident med at virkeliggøre det ukrainske folks forventninger. UP.

26.01.05. Jusjtjenko oplyser, at der vil blive rejst tiltale i Gongadze-sagen

Præsident Viktor Jusjtjenko oplyser, at straffesagen mod lederen af indenrigsministeriets overvågningstjeneste, Oleksij Pukatj, som overvågede Gongadze, er overgivet til domstolene. På en pressekonference i Europarådet i går sagde Jusjtjenko, at han var blevet informeret herom af rigsadvokaten.

"Jeg har haft et møde med rigsadvokaten, hvor jeg gav udtryk for, at jeg ville ønske, at der i den nærmeste fremtid blev sat et punktum i Gongadze-sagen og at sagen blev overdraget til retten, så alle, der ønsker at følge retssagen, kan gøre det. Det er vigtigt, at det bliver en offentlig proces", sagde Jusjtjenko.

"Rigsadvokaten svarede - for syv dage siden - at man "i dag har sendt to sager til retten, som har en direkte forbindelse til Gia Gongadze-sagen". Den ene sag vedrører general Pukatj, mens jeg ikke ved, hvilket formelt navn man skal give den anden sag", tilføjede Jusjtjenko. "Jeg forstår, at dette ikke kan være et svar, men begyndelsen til formuleringen af et svar", påpegede han.

Jusjtjenko sagde, at han i næste uge vil indlede "møder med Gias mor, og jeg vil gerne diskutere alle omstændighederne i denne sag".

Adspurgt om, hvorvidt der vil være en retssag mod Kutjma, svarede Jusjtjenko: "Vi vil kunne vinde, når vi kan bevise, at det er loven, der styrer i Ukraine - uanset om du er præsident eller forretningsmand. En anden vej ville simpelthen være fejlslagen".

Men en vestlig journalist afbrød Jusjtjenko, eftersom denne ikke havde givet noget konkret svar. Alligevel sagde Jusjtjenko: "Vi vil handle i henhold til loven indenfor alle de sager, hvor loven er blevet overtrådt - hvad enten det drejer sig om Kutjma, "Krivorizhstål" eller andre".

Under pressekonferencen undveg Jusjtjenko også at svare på spørgsmålet om, hvad Putin sagde til ham vedrørende tiltalen mod Tymoshenko i Rusland.

"Jeg rejste et spørgsmål vedrørende Julia Volodymyrivna Tymoshenko udfra den vinkel, som havde min interesse. Og jeg fik det svar, som for mig var tilstrækkeligt og korrekt i forhold til Tymoshenko", sagde Jusjtjenko. UP.


26.01.05. Jusjtjenko blev udsat for adskillige giftmordforsøg (eng.)

January 23, 2005

Eve of the inauguration On the day of Viktor Yushchenko's inauguration, Tom Mangold reveals the extraordinary story of his rivals' plot to deny him power.

The big khaki tents are coming down in Independence Square and the braziers are being doused. The Orange Revolutionaries, shrunk from half a million to a few hundred, are going home.

It's inauguration day for new President Viktor Yushchenko, Ukraine's modernist President, a reformer who beat a brutal and medieval assassination attempt by poisoning and an outrageous example of poll rigging last November to become Ukraine's new leader.

And only now are the astonishing truths of Mr Yushchenko's fight for the leadership he had earned being revealed.

An investigation has discovered:

- Britain's germ warfare laboratory in Porton Down has received a biopsy of his skin which shows several poisoning attempts over a four-week period.

- Not one but two deadly poisons have been found in his body.

- Evidence has emerged that seems to link one of Russian President Vladimir Putin's closest staff members to the murder plot.

As Mr Yushchenko's face erupted in a mask of cysts and pustules and even as he fought for his life, his nation came dangerously close to a civil war deliberately engineered by his political enemies.

What stopped a war that could have torn this crucial state bordering western and eastern Europe apart was a series of extraordinary co-ordinated intelligence operations. Those operations involved a breakaway faction of Ukraine's Secret Service, the SBU, Ukraine's military intelligence, with CIA and MI6 officers. They helped by running their own special operations to frustrate corrupt politicians and gangsters who tried to seize power from the newly elected leader.

American and British agents used spy satellites, intercept technology and old-fashioned dirty tricks against President Leonid Kuchma, the departing leader, and his allies and cronies. In the end, Mr Kuchma's power and authority simply hemorrhaged away and he was left unable to exercise his authority.

Mr Yushchenko was given a large final dose of a deadly toxin at a dinner on September 5 organised by the leader of the SBU, General Ihor Smeshko, and his deputy, General Volodymyr Satsyuk, at the latter's Kyiv dacha. General Smeshko is believed to have been unaware of the poison plot. Both the cook and the waiter that night have been spirited out of the country by Mr Yushchenko's team and have written admissions of involvement. The amount of poison needed to kill him was the size of a poppy seed.

In an exclusive interview, Professor Mykola Policshuk, the leading authority on the Parliamentary Special Investigation Commission into Mr Yushchenko's poisoning, said: "Two, not one, poisons have been found in his tissue samples. I have not the slightest doubt this was an attempt to murder him. The plan was to give a huge dose at that dinner party so he would die the next day and be buried without the kind of post-mortem examination that would have revealed the dioxin and the other poison - an endo-toxin.

"What may have saved his life was that he vomited on the way home. Either way, it's a miracle he lived."

In another interview, Mr Yushchenko's head of security, Yevhen Chervonenko, revealed how he had been tricked out of attending that dinner.

"I was in the car behind Yushchenko and his state bodyguard when I got a call from the bodyguard telling me I was not required on that night because Yushchenko was going to a secret meeting. Normally, I go everywhere with him and taste his food.

"That night, I was deliberately cut out. When my boss got to the dacha, his bodyguard was ordered to stay in the car. Yushchenko was on his own, he had his own plate of food. If I had been there, this could never have happened."

The man in charge of the commission of investigation, a supporter of rival candidate Victor Yanukovich said: "I don't think Yushchenko was poisoned. I've had no official papers to prove it. Look here, I've got his medical records, he was a sick man. Look at this, he had a lot of herpes zoster - that could have been behind the so-called poisoning."

The plans to prevent the great presidential robbery of Ukraine and protect the people's rightfully elected leader were hatched mid-year. Washington and London, mindful of Mr Kuchma's unappetising record as a corrupt arms dealer and implicated in several murders, gently warned him that if any attempt were made to rig the election, he would find himself disgraced and isolated. To press the point, one of Mr Kuchma's closest business associates suddenly found he could not get a visa to visit the US. The message was deliberate and clear.

Nevertheless, Mr Kuchma and Viktor Medvedchuk, his gatekeeper and chief of staff, became involved in a colossal election fraud, so blatant it was easily spotted by the hundreds of independent election monitors last year.

Mr Putin also took a deep interest in the election in a border nation whose allegiance between the East and the West is almost split. The miners of the East look to Russia. Mr Putin noisily supported their candidate, Mr Yanukovich.

Shortly before Christmas, a courier arrived at the security gate of Ukraine's Channel 5 carrying an anonymous letter written in Russian and a CD. The CD had extracts of intercepted phone conversations between two men, one in Moscow and one in Kyiv, talking about the poisoning of Mr Yushchenko. One name mentioned on the CD is that of Gleb Pavlovskiy, a close adviser to President Putin.

I have listened to the CD and I have the transcript. Although its bona fides have yet to be forensically tested, diplomats in Kyiv who have heard it and read the transcripts take it seriously.

Volodymyr Ariev, the Channel 5 journalist who has investigated the background, said: "I now know the identity of both men on the intercept. The man in Kyiv has admitted to me that the conversation is real and that Moscow was indeed involved in the poisoning, but it doesn't follow that Putin knew or ordered it.

"The recording was done by a rogue faction of the FSB (the replacement to the KGB) who are opposed to Putin and Pavlovskiy."

If the Kremlin did have a hand in the events in Ukraine, as most observers now believe, they unwittingly came across a series of Western intelligence operations that simply outsmarted them.

By November, an important section of the SBU had veered away from Mr Kuchma's tyrannies and believed the future lay with modernist reformers like Mr Yushchenko. Some of this may have been self-serving, but it was realistic and was encouraged by small teams of CIA and MI6 officers sent to back up their respective stations in Kyiv for the most important elections in 20 years.

An intelligence net involving Mr Yushchenko's youthful and energetic chief of staff, Oleg Rybachuk, an important faction of the SBU, Ukrainian military intelligence and British and US ambassadors was established. When Mr Rybachuk received SBU warnings of attempts to disrupt the elections or threats to Mr Yushchenko, he reported these to both ambassadors.

Spy satellites maintained round-the-clock vigilance and Western teams inside Ukraine established an enormous communications intercept. Slowly it became clear that a substantial number of Mr Kuchma's players were deserting his team.

Washington and London told Mr Kuchma: "We have no horses in the election race, and we will work with whoever wins - legitimately. But one hint of election fraud or hanky-panky and the West will be tough on you. Your country deserves a fully transparent and democratic poll - at last."

The British warned the much disliked Minister of the Interior, General Mykola Bilokon, that if he misbehaved he would find unusual difficulties in ever getting a visa to visit any West European country or the US.

So monitors were astonished when, despite the gentle warnings, the first election round showed blatant evidence of crude election rigging and fraud. Why did Mr Kuchma still allow it? One observer told me: "Because he had to, he could not have won any other way."

After the fraudulent "win" by Mr Yanukovich, Ukraine began to spiral into conflict. Half a million supporters of Mr Yushchenko and democracy - the Orange Revolutionaries - gathered in Independence Square, thousands camped there. Tents, stoves, food, medical supplies, polystyrene boards for sleeping on in the bitter cold arrived as if my magic. In fact, much had been planned.

Western intelligence officers had one overriding aim - to ensure that the thousands of protesters would not be provoked into violence. They believed that if the young people held, the country would hold.

And indeed, an extraordinary discipline was maintained among the thousands of revolutionaries - much of it exercised by an intriguing activist organisation called PORA. This largely unknown student organisation (there are no members) organised revolutionaries along para-military lines. Sex, drugs and alcohol, but not rock'n'roll were forbidden. Skinhead and secret police provocations were ignored.

Western intelligence officers had recommended constant music and rock concerts to distract the huge crowd, which virtually owned the heart of Kyiv. My conversations with PORA leaders reveal that some of them attended a seminar in the Crimea funded by the American Freedom House Foundation - whose chairman is former CIA chief James Woolsey, and USAID, where these techniques were taught.

As support for Mr Yushchenko grew daily, the Yanukovich-Kuchma faction became more desperate. They decided to transport miners from Donetsk on the Russian border and diehard Yanukovich supporters to Kyiv to counter-demonstrate the students. The intention was clear - they would spark a conflict and violence and crack down on the peaceful Orange Revolutionaries. The fighting would not just crack skulls, it would lead to a suspension of Parliament, of the elections, a one-year state of emergency and the continued rule of President Kuchma.

Then a curious thing happened. As the miners gathered in Donetsk, free vodka was handed out. They got vodka on their coaches and trains, and they were met in Kyiv by trucks loaded with crates of vodka. By the time they had been in Kyiv for an hour or so, most were paralytically drunk.

"No, the vodka was not a coincidence," said Alex Kiselev, a close adviser to Yushchenko rival Yanukovich, glumly. "We realised what was going on too late. It wasn't illegal but it was damned clever. It was a trick and we were dumb enough to fall for it, we shot ourselves in the foot with that one. It was all very scripted. There were hundreds of Western agents in Ukraine."

The miners' fiasco increased Mr Kuchma's desperation. The fraudulent election had been exposed, Mr Yushchenko was still alive, although very ill and in considerable pain; the poisoning had become public knowledge, sympathy for the victim had grown, and the fingers pointed openly at Kuchma cronies. Moscow was being dragged in too.

Then on November 28, the Empire struck back.

Around 10pm, the commander of the Minister of the Interior's ample forces, Lieutenant-General Serhiy Popkov, ordered that live ammunition be handed out to 13,000 of his men waiting at bases outside Kyiv.

But so penetrated was the ministry that within 45 minutes the phones were ringing in the homes of leading Western diplomats in Kyiv. They learned that General Popkov's men were marching towards Independence Square. The crackdown had begun.

Washington alerted its ambassador to satellite imagery, which confirmed his worst fears. Infra-red cameras had picked up the telltale signs of trucks on the move despite the clouds and despite the night.

The ambassador reportedly alerted Secretary of State Colin Powell, who put a call into Mr Kuchma, who refused to take it.

The ambassador called Viktor Pinchuk, the President's powerful son-in-law, and warned him that Mr Kuchma would not be let off the hook by ignoring the call from the Secretary of State.

In urgent meetings and telephone calls, Mr Kuchma, his hard-line Minister of the Interior, General Popkov and Mr Medvedchuk were made painfully aware that a substantial part of the SBU and military intelligence were now out of Government control.

The crunch came when Mr Kuchma learned from his top generals that they could not support an attack on the Orange Revolutionaries and they would protect "the innocent public".

His authority had leaked away. The SBU, the army, the outside world and the people who voted for change had finally defeated one of the most corrupt gangster-states in the world.

First thing tomorrow, Mr Yushchenko's bodyguard will be changed.

Someone from his entourage has had access to his food and this will stop.

His final victory has already brought about a significant reaction. After the Yushchenko victory, Minister of Transport Heorhiy Kirpa blew his brains out in his sauna. He had been associated with allegations of extensive corruption.

Although Mr Yushchenko is anxious to keep Moscow on side, his inauguration has been a triumph for the man, the new machine, for those in the West who believe it helps to give democracy a gentle shove now and then and for 48 million Ukrainians who will begin to taste freedom for the first time.

26.01.05. Yushchenko's poisoning: the background

JANE'S INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
JANUARY 21, 2005

Western governments and international organisations were shocked to hear confirmation in December from an internationally respected Viennese medical clinic that Ukrainian opposition winner Viktor Yushchenko was poisoned four months earlier. JID's regional correspondent reports on allegations that will have serious repercussions in post-election Ukraine.

"This was a project of political murder prepared by the authorities," Yushchenko claimed. Meanwhile, Western governments have called for those behind the poisoning to be brought to justice. This is now more likely after Yushchenko's victory in the re-run Ukrainian elections, which took place on 26 December.

Yushchenko himself has warned: "I have no doubt that, within several days or weeks, this path will lead the authorities to specific people representing the government - who administered the poison, who was involved and from whom the poison was procured."

The Soviet record of assassinating opponents abroad is long and very well documented. Four Ukrainian nationalist leaders were assassinated by the Soviet security services between 1926 and 1959 in Paris, Rotterdam and Munich. Two of these assassinations were carried out in Munich with a gun that sprayed heart attack-inducing poison into the face of the victim. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) became aware of the poison only after a KGB assassin who had previously used it defected to the US in 1961.

Under President Vladimir Putin, a former KGB officer, this practice has returned. Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) agents were arrested in Qatar in February, after being accused of assassinating a Chechen exile.

In Ukraine, opponents of the outgoing administration have either died at the hands of a Ministry of Interior Spetsnaz special forces unit, or as a result of attacks carried out by so-called 'skinheads' linked to organised criminal gangs. In March 1999, opposition Rukh leader Vyacheslav Chornovil died in a car 'accident', after the vehicle in which he was travelling was hit by a Kamaz truck, a heavy-duty vehicle that has figured in many 'accidents' in Ukraine. An attempt to kill Yushchenko in early August using a Kamaz truck failed.

A videotape interview of Ministry of Interior Spetsnaz officers admitting to organising Chornovil's murder was passed in 1999 to then opposition presidential candidate and former Security Service (SBU) chairman Yevhen Marchuk. This potentially explosive tape is expected to be released to the incoming Yushchenko administration once it re-opens investigations into a series of alleged political murders.

The attempt on Yushchenko

It now seems likely that Yushchenko was either poisoned during a trip to Crimea in late August 2004 or at a dinner. Ministry of Interior officers were caught carrying out a surveillance operation against Yushchenko in Crimea.

The poison involved - TCDD, the most toxic form of dioxin - can take up to two weeks to take effect. TCDD was also a key ingredient of Agent Orange, which was used by US forces during the Vietnam War. The level of this dioxin found in samples taken from Yushchenko was 6,000 times higher than normal and the second highest ever recorded.

On audio tapes illicitly made in pro-Moscow Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych's secret campaign headquarters by elements of the SBU loyal to Yushchenko, there is evidence that may provide clues. There was a conversation concerning surveillance of Yushchenko's election headquarters in Kyiv and ways to carry out a secret operation against him. Those recorded speaking on the tapes complain about the presence of a bank's video security cameras close to Yushchenko's headquarters.

Yushchenko's wife said that she tasted "a metallic-smelling medicine" on her husband's lips after he returned home from a dinner. Yushchenko himself has expressed the view that this occasion was the most likely opportunity for the poison to be administered as it was the only time he did not take security measures to test his food.

The political background is significant. Until round two of the elections on 21 November, the Kuchma-Yanukovych camp was prepared to 'win' the elections using fraud. Given what was then seen as the inevitability of a Yanukovych presidency, they did not fear legal action following victory in the poll.

US National Intelligence Council sources believe that the timing of the poisoning was highly suspicious. By early September 2004, the authorities had planned that after two months of a very dirty campaign their candidate, Yanukovych, would be ahead. However, at that stage Yushchenko's lead was actually growing.

It is highly likely that the audacious poisoning was a desperate act of panic by his political opponents. Yushchenko twice visited the Vienna clinic for treatment and this removed him from the election campaign for four weeks. By the end of the campaign in October 2004 his ratings caught up to Yushchenko's. Dubious results released in round one showed Yanukovych and Yushchenko level at 40 per cent.

The 'Orange Revolution' undermined Yanukovych's attempted fraudulent election victory when mass protests after the second round forced a re-run on 26 December, handing victory to Yushchenko.

Interestingly, suspicion has not fallen on SBU chairman Ihor Smeshko who, according to JID sources, has personal sympathies with the Yushchenko camp.

Russian connection?

Yushchenko has publicly alleged a Russian connection to his poisoning, a claim that has been denied by politicians allied to Putin. Russian opposition leader Boris Nemtsov, head of the Union of Right Forces, has stated that he cannot rule out the involvement of the Federal Security Service (FSB), Russia's domestic secret service, which is charged with carrying out espionage activities in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

TCDD dioxin is not produced commercially and cannot be digested naturally. It is a chemical mixture, rather than a specific poison. The preparation of the dioxin could have been undertaken in a former KGB secret chemical/biological laboratory that is now under the control of the FSB.

Renegade intelligence officer Alexander V. Litvinenko, who served in the KGB and the FSB before defecting to Britain, has revealed that the FSB controls a secret laboratory in Moscow that specialises in the study of poisons. Meanwhile, a former dissident scientist now living in the US, Vil Mirzayanov, has confirmed that dioxins were studied in this laboratory during the development of defoliants for the military. Moreover, Valeriy Krawchenko, an SBU defector, has also pointed to this FSB laboratory as the likely source of the dioxin that was used to poison Yushchenko.

Such poisoning incidents are not unknown in Russia. A leading Russian banker, Ivan Kivelidi, died in 1995 after using a telephone contaminated with a poisonous substance. In 2002, a Saudi militant named Khattab, who was working for the Chechens, died after opening a poisoned letter. In September 2004 - the same month that Yushchenko was poisoned - the prominent Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya was poisoned on a flight to Beslan, where Chechen rebels had taken over a school. She survived.

Repercussions

Under Yushchenko's presidency, the poisoning incident is set to have wide-ranging domestic and foreign policy ramifications. Domestically, it will further erode Kuchma's tarnished reputation and further undermine the political party he relies on for support, Medvedchuk's SDPUo. Medvedchuk is already being accused of involvement in election fraud.

Internationally, the attempt on Yushchenko's life will undermine Putin's reputation in Ukraine and abroad. The Russian president's open interference in Ukraine's elections has been widely condemned by Western governments. This is likely to lead to a reassessment of Western foreign policy towards Putin's increasingly authoritarian Russia.

27.01.05. "Vores Ukraine" splittet over Tymoshenko

Et af de ledende medlemmer af fraktionen "Vores Ukraine" Mykola Tomenko siger, at hvis nogle af de deputerede fra fraktionen "Vores Ukraine" ikke vil stemme på Julia Tymoshenko som premierminister, vil der snarere være tale om en undtagelse end en regel. 

Han påpeger, at det i "Vores Ukraine" i dag ikke er så meget diskussionen om, hvorvidt man skal støtte eller undlade at støtte Tymoshenko som Ukraines premierminister, som diskussionen om, hvilken strategi man skal anlægge i forhold til de politiske alliancepartnere - altså Julia Tymoshenkos blok, SPU og andre allierede - frem til 2006, der gør sig gældende.

Tomenko henleder opmærksomheden på, at regeringen fra 2006 vil tilhøre det politiske parti, som vinder ved parlamentsvalget. Ifølge ham er det meget vigtigt element i de overvejelser, som medlemmerne af "Vores Ukraines" fraktion gør sig.

Han påpeger, at det drejer sig om at realisere præsident Viktor Jusjtjenkos program, eftersom det på visse punkter er beregnet til at løbe over en femårig periode, og på visse punkter over en tiårig periode.

"Det absolutte flertal af medlemmerne af fraktionen "Vores Ukraine" har forståelse for, at man bør indgå kompromiser med de politiske partnere - BJuT og SPU - for at realisere programmet", siger Tomenko. Han understreger, at der blandt de deputerede i fraktionen "Vores Ukraine" i dag er taktiske forskelle i tilgangene til spørgsmålet om "den politiske opbygning".

Tomenkos bud er, at man efter denne diskussion vil præcisere "logikken og alle de politiske kræfters placering i den proces, som fører til 2006", og at det "vil løse størstedelen af problemerne". UNIAN. UP.


27.01.05. Politiet siger, at transportministeren begik selvmord

Efterforskningen i sagen omkring Ukraines transportminister Heorhij Kirpa har nu definitivt forkastet teorien om et mord, skriver avisen "Segodnja" med henvisning til kilder i politiet, som har informeret avisen om visse detaljer i efterforskningen af straffesag nr. 49-1395, der omhandler ministerens død. Eksperterne er helt enige om, at der er tale om et selvmord", skriver avisen.

På grundlag af den retsmedicinske undersøgelse har man bekræftet den foreløbige konklusion; nemlig at døden indtraf som følge af et skud i højre tinding (ikke i munden).

Det var Kirpa selv, der affyrede pistolen af mærket PSM 5,15 mm, som befandt sig i højre hånd (dvs. at teorien om et mord endegyldigt er bortfaldet ifølge eksperterne). Der var kun ét skud, idet kuglen gik ud igen og borede sig ind i saunaens væg. Samme sted har man fundet det patronhylster, som er også er inddraget som bevismateriale. Døden indtraf omgående.

Ifølge "Segodnja" bekræfter efterforskningen også, at der var en vandret læsion henover indgangssåret fra pistolkuglen samt en række læsioner i andre dele af ansigtet. Deres beskaffenhed var i starten uklar og gav anledning til en formodning om, at der havde været tale om en kamp forud for det dødbringende skud... Da resultaterne af ekspertisen forelå, forkastede politiet imidlertid denne teori til fordel for teorien om, at disse læsioner var en følge af faldet".

Ifølge avisen "har man også løst spørgsmålet om, hvorfor kuglen sad fast i saunaens væg i 93 cm højde over gulvet (man tvivlede på, Kirpas højde taget i betragtning, at han kunne have skudt i liggende stilling). Eksperterne nåede frem til, at Kirpa trykkede på aftrækkeren i siddende stilling".

Avisen minder om, at alt dette skete i saunaen, hvor der er hylder, som man kan sidde på. "Segodnja" påpeger, at "uanset, at ikke alle undersøgelser endnu er afsluttet, viser analyserne, at der ikke er blevet fundet spor af giftstoffer, alkohol eller andre skadelige stoffer i vævet".

I en anden artikel fremlægger "Segodnja" forskellige teorier om Kirpas dødsfald, som avisen deler op i tre dele: "Han blev han tvunget til det af personer, som ønskede at indtage posten som minister for et af landets mest indbringende ministerier under den nye præsident Jusjtjenko (efter sigende havde Kirpa allerede aftalt med Jusjtjenko, at han ville beholde posten og derfor blev ministeren tvunget til at forlade den på anden vis). Underteorier: "han blev "myrdet" af kompromitterende materialer, familien blev truet osv. Den anden teori går ud på, at han blev tvunget til at begå selvmord af personer, som han havde samarbejdet med under det gamle styre og havde haft nogle forretningsmæssige projekter med - muligvis i forbindelse med valget (her er den sandsynlige teori hævn og forsøg på at skaffe sig af med et vidne). Den tredje teori er, at han begik selvmord uden ydre tvang. Han kan have frygtet afsløringerne, at blive sat udenfor i det nye styres hierarki, eller han kan have haft personlige grunde til det (sygdom eller nervøst sammenbrud). UNIAN. UP.


28.01.05. EU vil ikke smække døren i for Ukraine

Den europæiske Unions udvidelseskommissær Olli Rehn siger, at Eurounionen ikke kan lukke døren for et muligt medlemskab for Ukraine, fordi der er tale om en europæisk stat.

I dagens interview med Tv-stationen "Reuters" i den schweiziske by Davos roste Rehn også Ukraines præsident Viktor Jusjtjenkos indsats for at få en aftale i stand mellem Ukraine og EU om associeret medlemskab til 2007.

Rehn betegnede dette mål som modigt; men fornuftigt og reelt, fordi Jusjtjenko ifølge ham ikke har travlt med at komme med en medlemskabsansøgning over hals og hoved, men betoner de konkrete tiltag og agter at forbedre de økonomiske og handelsmæssige relationer og den politiske dialog.

Indtil videre skal Ukraine ifølge den europæiske udvidelseskommissær bevæge sig i retning af en tilnærmelse til EU indenfor rammerne af den europæiske naboskabspolitik, oplyser radio Liberty.

31.01.05. Yushchenko outlines Ukraine's desire to "return to Europe"

By Taras Kuzio

This week the EU finally came round to the conclusion that Viktor's Yushchenko's support for Ukraine "returning to Europe" is no hollow rhetoric. Former president Leonid Kuchma also spoke of "returning to Europe" in 1998, when he first outlined plans for Ukraine to join the EU; four years later he added NATO membership to this goal. Unfortunately, neither the EU nor NATO ever took his declarations seriously. Yushchenko's support for the same policies is noteworthy because he, unlike Kuchma, is believable. Speaking to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) Yushchenko claimed that Ukraine's future lies inside Europe because, "We, along with the people of Europe, belong to one civilization" (Financial Times, January 25).

Yushchenko told PACE, "The realization of the strategy of our foreign policy aim is membership in the European Union." Domestic reforms in Ukraine to assist integration will "become a real, and not a declarative, reality," a clear jab at the empty rhetoric of the Kuchma era (Ukrayinska pravda, January 25). To applause and laughter Yushchenko told PACE that, after his reforms, Ukraine will have changed so much that the EU itself will ask, "Why are you, such a fantastic place, not yet in the European Union?" (Ukrayinska pravda, January 25).

The seriousness of Yushchenko's plans was detailed by his deputy prime minister for European integration, Oleh Rybachuk, who threatened to "undertake an orange revolution in Brussels" if the EU continued to ignore Ukraine (Ukrayinska pravda, January 18). Rybachuk, with strong Polish backing, is eager to launch a two-year drive to fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria required for EU membership. "I can understand Ukraine's entry into Europe as my life's aim," Rybachuk admitted (Ukrayinska pravda, January 18).

Yet, Yushchenko's focus on the EU is causing consternation in Brussels, as the EU already has a full agenda: absorbing ten new members, adopting a constitution, and bringing in Turkey. As The Times (January 25) wrote, "Whether Ukraine should be allowed to set foot on the path that leads to membership is a question diplomats try hard to avoid." But now that the EU has agreed to admit Turkey, it has a more difficult time rejecting Ukraine.

Britain, a key supporter of Turkish membership, is now in a quandary. An EU that is "widened" to the borders of Iran, Iraq, and Syria is one that is never likely to be "deepened" in the manner that France and Germany desire. A "wider," as opposed to a "deeper," EU could never become a superpower rivaling the United States. This would mean that Europe would continue to delegate security issues to NATO, rather than build up its own independent force. While this explains why France and Germany were always lukewarm about Turkey, it does not explain Britain's position. Under the logic of "deepening" versus "widening," Britain should promote Ukraine after Turkey. Yet, London isn't, and Britain's policy is contradictory. The Times (January 25) explains this paradox in three ways.

First, there is greater support for Ukraine joining the EU than there is for Turkey. Agreeing to let Ukraine in might therefore upset plans for Turkey.

Second, many EU members believe there should be a period to "digest" the ten new members. After the latest expansion, there is little appetite for new members.

Third, "At the same time, Britain does not want to be seen to undermine Yushchenko's heroic bid to lead his country in a different direction," said The Times. The Orange Revolution fundamentally changed Ukraine's international image in a positive direction. There is a widespread view in the West, as echoed in the media and among government ministers, that Ukraine has now "earned" its place in Europe.

As EU External Affairs Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner admitted, "We have to recognize this new political reality in Ukraine" (Financial Times, January 25). On January 13, the European Parliament issued an appeal to the European Commission and EU Council calling upon the EU to review the EU-Ukraine Action Plan, which currently does not provide for Ukraine's future membership.

Ukraine's allies in the EU include all eight of the new post-communist members, led by Poland. Austria, Finland, and Sweden also support Ukraine's EU membership. Poland, which had backed Turkish membership, has broken ranks with London by lobbying for Ukraine to be invited to join at the same time as Turkey. Poland sees a Ukraine inside the EU and NATO as the best way to secure stability on its eastern flank and provide a buffer between itself and Russia.

France, which always was cool to Turkish membership, is even colder towards Ukraine, because it fears harming relations with Russia. France and Germany, whose leaders have very warm relations with Russian President Vladimir Putin, continue to look at Ukraine through Russian eyes. They also continue to see Russia as a useful counter-balance to an American hyper-power.

Yushchenko is keen to quickly follow through on both the momentum of the Orange Revolution and his plans for Ukraine to "return to Europe." Ukraine is to formally apply for EU membership this year, a step that Kuchma never undertook. "The new president and government of Ukraine will do everything in its power" towards this aim, Rybachuk declared (Ukrayinska pravda, January 22).

The EU founding treaty states unequivocally that any country geographically situated in Europe can join the EU. The EU will be therefore in an extremely uncomfortable position if it formally turns down Ukraine's application.

Thus far, Yushchenko has not discussed Ukraine's plans for NATO, because it is a more sensitive issue inside Ukraine and regarding Russia. But, if the EU snubs Ukraine's membership application, Kyiv will have greater incentive to focus on NATO membership, which is far easier to achieve, has broad U.S. support, and is a step where Russian concerns are less likely to be taken into account.


31.01.05. SDPU (o) uafklaret om, hvorvidt man er i opposition

Folkedeputeret Ihor Shurma siger, at SDPU (o)'s fraktion først vil tage endelig stilling til, om man hører til oppositionen, i forbindelse med, at man vil drøfte spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt man vil stemme for indstillingen af Julia Tymoshenko som Ukraines premierminister, oplyser UNIAN.

"Spørgsmålet (om Tymoshenko som premierminister, red.) bør sætte tingene på plads. Man bør holde op med at sniksnakke om at være i opposition; men bør i stedet handle. Han fremhæver, at der i fraktionen indtil videre ikke har været nogen entydig holdning til, hvordan man skal stemme. Samtidig udtrykker han håb om, at hvis fraktionen taler om at være i opposition, så kan den handle i overensstemmelse med hermed. "Hvis vi ikke blive indbudt til at deltage i regeringen, så kan fraktionen ikke stå med ansvaret for styrets handlinger", siger Shurma.

Som tidligere omtalt sagde lederen af SDPU (o) Viktor Medvetjuk under en pressekonference den 26. januar i Kiev officielt, at partiet nu gik over i opposition til det nuværende styre. ProUA.

31.01.05. Regeringen vil sikre Kutjma med livslang pension

Lederen af KPU's fraktion, Petro Symonenko, vil tage initiativ til en høring i parlamentet Verkhovna Rada vedrørende den ukrainske regerings meddelelse om, at man vil offentliggøre et dekret om en livslang pension til den tidligere præsident Leonid Kutjma. Det sagde Symonenko til journalisterne efter et koordinerende møde for lederne af parlamentets fraktioner, oplyser ProUA's korrespondent.

Symonenko understreger, at der indtil videre ikke er vedtaget nogen lov om Ukraines præsident, og at udstedelsen af en sådan regeringsforordning derfor vil være ulovlig. Kommunisternes leder understregede også, at Ukraines borgere bør vide, hvad deres penge bliver brugt.

KPU's leder understreger, at udstedelsen af den pågældende regeringsforordning er en præcedens, hvor "hver eneste bør have et personligt ansvar". Symonenko understreger, at lederne af fraktionerne i parlamentet ikke kunne gå ind for en høring. Samtidig understreger kommunisternes leder, at han i morgen i parlamentssalen vil kræve, at spørgsmålet kommer på dagsordenen. ProUA.